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Abstract:  
This study empirically examines the rationales that motivate firms to go private. Based on a 
sample of 64 German going-private transactions between 1997 and 2001, we find that a firm 
is more likely to go private the higher the average annual dividend yield growth, the higher 
the market-to-book value of equity, the lower the average annual net sales growth, the lower 
the free-float, and the lower the average market capitalisation. These results provide support 
for the agency cost of free cash flow but contradict the information asymmetry motivation of 
going-private. In addition, the importance of transaction cost rather than information 
asymmetry and the role of concentrated ownership are highlighted. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Over the last decade the German capital market has undergone tremendous changes and 
along with it the answer to the question “What is the optimal form of incorporation?” has 
been reconsidered. Prior to 2000 many companies went public thereby following a trend 
evoked mainly by the initial public offering (IPO) of the Deutsche Telekom AG or Deutsche 
Post AG. The majority of these corporations believed that a state of being-public is “a symbol 
of success, and can bring with it intangible benefits like prestige and market visibility” 
(Johnson and Weidhass, 2001). However, following the bull market of the late 1990s, 
Germany’s stock market along with many other markets worldwide experienced a massive 
correction in share prices since the spring of 2000. Many listed companies are now trading 
below the issuing price or even beneath their equity base. Consequently, corporate 
management often inferred that a continuance as a public entity is unbeneficial and began to 
re-examine the benefits of the IPO’s counter-rotating strategy, the so-called going-private 
strategy or public-to-private (PtP) transaction. In the past, German jurisdiction long 
prohibited companies’ voluntary listing termination and only with the commencement of the 
Takeover Code (Umwandlungsgesetz) in 1995 a statutory basis was given, enabling 
corporations to convert their corporate form to a non- listable legal form. Thus, following the 
IPO trend in the 1990s, in the 2000s Germany experienced a second trend, although this time 
driven by an increasing number of going-private transactions. It is expected that this going-
private trend will intensify further due to additional regulatory changes in 2001 and 2002. 
While the going-public transactions of the 1990s have enjoyed widespread attention from 
practitioners and academics alike and while at present regulators and managers are clearly 
concerned with the role of going-private transactions, academic attention towards German 
going-private transactions has so far been limited. This is especially surprising as, due to the 
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special features of the German corporate finance system, these PtP transactions allow 
researchers to judge the relevance of concentrated ownership structure, a feature that has not 
yet been investigated directly. This study attempts to remedy these shortcomings by 
investigating the motives behind going-private transactions. Borrowing from the empirical 
literature on takeovers1, this study attempts to predict going-private candidates and is thus 
able to show whether and how market imperfections such as agency cost and asymmetric 
information can explain a company’s decision to go private. The study at hand is novel in 
several aspects. First, rather than concentrating on a fraction of potential going-private 
transaction forms (merger), this study considers the complete set from which a company can 
choose in order to reverse its public company to a private entity. Second, the employed 
sample exclusively consists of German companies which, third, enables us to investigate the 
role of ownership structure and market (il)liquidity. Fourth, rather than focusing on either the 
information asymmetry approach or the agency cost of free cash flow, this study will 
incorporate both theories simultaneously. It should be pointed out that while there might be 
other internal and external factors influencing the likelihood of a going-private activity, this 
study specifically focuses on quantifiable financial and capital market characteristics. 
Consequently, we will especially disregard going-private motives, which result from tax 
savings incentives.  
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section II introduces the fundamentals of going-
private transactions. In section III hypotheses are derived that explain the motives for and the 
profile of German going-private firms. Section IV presents the data and methodology 
whereas in Section V the empirical findings are presented and interpreted. Section VI 
concludes. 
                                                 
1 There have been many previous studies, which have used likelihood models to predict takeover targets 
including Stevens (1973), Belkoui (1978), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Palepu (1986), Rao, Waters and Payne 
(1995) and Nuttall (1999).  
  3
 
II. The Practice of Going-Private 
According to Land and Hasselbach (2000), going-private2 can be defined as “converting a 
public listed corporation (public company) to a closed, not publicly traded entity (private 
company)”. Thus, going-private attempts to restructure corporate ownership by replacing the 
entire public stock interest with full equity ownership. As DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice 
(1984, p.903) state: “This procedure leaves only that group of insiders who direct the 
corporate reacquisition programs (usually the very ones who took the company public 
originally) as the surviving shareholders in a now privately held enterprise”. 
Going-private first appeared in the U.S. as early as 1886 (Kleppe, 2002) but until the 
1970s it has been extremely rare to find publicly held corporations revoking their listing 
admission. Yet, by the end of 1974 the Dow Jones Industrial Average had collapsed beneath 
600. Since for most companies the collapse had not been the result of reduced corporate 
earnings, stocks were at this time selling at far higher price-to-earnings ratios and multiples 
of book value than at any time in the adjacent years. As a consequence, the capital market 
lost its attractiveness and going-private gained in importance, as companies preferred to 
capitalize on this collapse in firm value and a continuation of its operations with less duties 
such as accounting- and disclosure requirements or shareholder communication. In the US, 
going-private reached its peak in the second half of the 1980s with more than 1200 
transactions (Oelschlegel, 2001) and was in some years even outnumbering IPOs (Kleppe, 
2002). Going-private transactions were also occurring in the United Kingdom but the number 
of transactions remained relatively low with as little as 10 transactions in 1990 increasing to 
27 and 39 transactions in 1998 and 1999, respectively (Hohn, 2000). In Germany however, 
termination of companies’ listing admission played only a minor role until 1994. Although, a 
                                                 
2 In recent papers the terms “Taking-Private”, “Reprivatization” and “Public-to-Private transactions” have 
emerged as synonyms for “going-private”. Rather than applying all these terms to the study at hand, we decide 
to use the terms “going-private” and “PtP transaction” interchangeably, in order to guarantee smooth reading.  
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statutory basis did not exist at that time, BASF AG unsuccessfully attempted to concentrate 
its market dealing at the Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse and thus, to terminate its quotation at 
the regional stock exchanges (de Vries, 2002). While BASF’s plans failed, its intentions set 
in motions the discussion under which circumstances a delisting is lega lly admissible. As a 
result, the Takeover Code (Umwandlungsgesetz, or short UmwG) came into force on January 
1, 1995, which for the first time created a statutory basis for a going-private transaction in 
Germany. Yet in the following months, Scheidemantel AG3 was the only company to go 
private. As a consequence of such limited response among listed companies the discussion 
vanished as fast as it rose. The reason for keeping going-private on the sidelines was, on the 
one hand, the absent knowledge about the various transaction forms and, on the other hand, 
its rather juvenile legal regulation within the German Stock Exchange Act (§ 43 Abs. 4 
BörsG4). Up to the revision of the Law On The Further Development Of Germany As A 
Financial Location (Gesetz zur weiteren Fortentwicklung des Finanzplatzes Deutschland, 
rather known under the term Drittes Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz), which came into force on 
April 1, 1998, the admissibility of either a partial or a regular delisting from German’s stock 
exchange(s) within the context of the German Capital Market Law was highly controversial 
(Bungert, 2000). Since 1999, going-private gathered momentum as more than 90 companies 
including Honsel AG, Stixi AG, Frankfurter Bankgesellschaft gegr. 1898 AG, Schaerf AG, 
Grünzweig AG, Rolf Benz AG, or Wayss & Freytag AG have gone private representing a 
substantial 8% of all companies currently listed5. In practice, going-private for a German 
company requires either a regular or a cold delisting. Delisting refers in general to the 
revocation of a company’s listing admission and thus, the cancellation of its public quotation 
and appears in three forms: regular (“reguläres”), cold (“kaltes”), or partial (“partielles”). 
                                                 
3 Deutsche Börse granted Scheidemantel’s application in 1995 and terminated its listing admission at the stock 
exchanges of Berlin, Düsseldorf and Hamburg. For details see de Vries (2002). 
4 For details we refer to: BGB1 I 529; BR-Printed Matter 605/97 15.08.1997 = BT-Printed Matter 13/8933 from 
the 6th of November 1997.  
5 On May 15, 2002, the Deutsche Börse AG reports 1078 listed companies. 
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Regular delisting is applied to the case in which a company voluntarily moves for the 
complete revocation of its listing admission or in which the revocation of the listing 
admission is caused ex officio 6. A cold delisting results from a corporate restructuring such as 
for example going-private merger, integration into the parent company, change of corporate 
form, reverse stock splits, or share repurchases where the resulting company no longer meets 
the listing requirements or prerequisites of the exchange. Finally, within a partial delisting a 
company revokes its listing admission at one of Germany’s seven regional stock exchanges 
under retention of its presence at (at least) one stock exchange in Germany7.  
Within the context of a cold delisting, both the merger and the change of corporate form 
were highly attractive tools to realize a PtP-transaction because of their tax advantages 
resulting from a depreciation potential of the resulting goodwill and the refunding of already 
paid corporation taxes. Nowadays, as a new Tax Act prohibits major actions and the objective 
to increase potential tax shields gains in importance, the recently created “Squeeze-Out” or 
“Freeze-Out”8 is expected to characterize prospective PtP-transactions. Here, a majority 
shareholder, holding a fraction of more than 95% of a company’s common stock, has the 
right to compulsory exclude the remaining shareholders (1) through a general meeting’s 
decision (qualified ¾ majority) and (2) under the payment of a reasonable cash settlement9. 
Accordingly, this approach represents a new legal institution of Germany’s AktG, to which 
no pattern existed before the Securities Acquisition And Takeover Act (Wertpapiererwerbs- 
und Übernahmegesetz, or short WpÜG) came into force in January 2002 (Vetter, 2002). A 
cheaper and much simpler way to exclude minority shareholders, a period-regulation, exists 
for companies seeking regular delisting at the Frankfurt exchange where instead of a cash 
                                                 
6 The termination of the listing admission ex officio is intended for the noncompliance of issuing requirements 
according to §§ 43 Abs. 3, 44 d BörsG or for companies whose shares are not traded regularly. 
7 For details see Kleppe (2002), Wirth and Arnold (2002), and Radtke (1998). 
8 Note that these terms are often used interchangeably. For a discussion on whether and how these terms should 
be distinguished see Kleppe (2002). 
9 For details we refer to: http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de. 
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settlement in which the share price is set to the average – but at least to the highest – stock 
price over the last six months, minority shareholders are given a 6 months period during 
which they can liquidate their holdings. 
In summary, the above discussion shows that the idioms going-private, delisting, and 
squeeze-out cannot be isolated from one another. The following four points are noteworthy: 
(1) a going-private depicts a transaction, where insiders attempt to reacquire from external 
investors all the publicly held common stock in order to obtain complete control at their 
firms. This requires either (2) a delisting from all national and international stock exchanges 
at which the publicly held common stocks are traded or on the other hand (3) a cold delisting. 
Furthermore, (4) a company’s partial termination of its listing admission at one of its regional 
stock exchange’s listing represents a step towards the achievement of the complete 
conversion to a private entity. For this study, we only consider regular voluntary delistings, 
cold delistings, freeze-outs, and period-regulations as constituting a going-private or PtP 
transaction. 
 
III. Motives for Going Private 
In recent years, the publicly held corporation was the main driving force of economic 
progress in Germany. However, according to many researchers including Zingales (1995), 
Köhler (2000),  Brühl (2002), de Vries (2002), Kleppe (2002) and Labbé and Poeschel (2002) 
the publicly held corporation has outlived its usefulness. Jensen (1997, p.1) makes this 
argument when stating that “[t]he publicly held corporation has outlived its usefulness in 
many sectors of the economy. New organizations are emerging. Takeovers, leveraged 
buyouts, and other going-private transactions are manifestations of this change”.  This 
statement raises several questions: What are the main reasons for organizations to operate 
under no public shareholders and not being listed or traded on organized exchanges? Why are 
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companies’ primary owners large institutions and entrepreneurs rather than diffused small 
retail investors? Why do companies use public and private debt, rather than public equity, as 
their major source of capital? In this context, modelling the going-private likelihood can cast 
light on the characteristics of those firms that go private and thus discover the motives 
underlying PtP-activities. By addressing these questions, we discuss the validity of two 
highly debated and documented finance theories that attempt to explain the structure of 
corporate ownership 10 and thus, going-private decisions: (1) agency cost of free cash flow 
and (2) information asymmetry. In addition, we test predictions based on illiquidity and 
ownership structure. Although several theories (especially tax-based11) are ignored, the 
hypotheses chosen arguably provide a reasonable coverage of the most important PtP-
transaction motives. 
A. Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow 
In an early empirical study, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) noticed that shareholders reaped 
large gains in going-private transactions that could not directly be attributed to synergies 
associated with the merger of two firms and looked into the direction of agency cost of free 
cash flows for a possible explanation. Although Jensen (1986) notices that agency costs of 
free cash flow are prevailing in almost all publicly held corporations, this problem is 
considered to be an essential facet of PtP transactions. Jensen characterizes potential going-
private candidates as firms operating under stable business environments and achieving 
substantial free cash flows, i.e. low growth prospects and large amounts of internally 
generated funds, which remain idle because of limited investment opportunities. Free cash 
flow retention and thus low payout ratios reflect managers’ propensity to increase the 
                                                 
10 The authors apply the term “ownership structure”, rather than “capital structure” to emphasize the importance 
of determining the fraction of the residual claim held by the managers as the crucial variables and not only 
companies’ debt-to-equity ratio. This view goes in line with Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
11 In Germany, as a result of the tax reform, non-tax motives such as the achievement of management’s 
unlimited control, access to free cash flows and the “noiseless” preparation of further growth objectives are 
expected to characterize future going-private activities.  
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resources under their control. Many of the benefits in going-private activities, especially 
through LBOs, seem to be due to the control function of debt. By increasing the debt-to-
equity ratio managers are restricted from engaging in investment and financing decisions that 
reduce the value of debtholder claim (debt covenants violations). Similarly, high dividend 
payouts reduce the amount of free cash flow, which is under the control of the management, 
and thus high payout can be an indicator of limited investment opportunities and high free 
cash flow. In a firm without any outside equityholders, as in the case of a PtP transaction, 
agency costs of free cash flow disappear. Consequently, one of the essential motives for PtP 
transactions is the reduction of agency cost, which is often referred to as the wealth-creation 
hypothesis.  
Empirical evidence on the validity of the agency cost of free cash flow hypothesis is 
mixed. Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Denis (1992), and Opler and Titman (1993) provide 
supporting evidence whereas Maupin, Bidwell and Ortegren (1984), Kieschnik (1998), 
Servaes (1994), Rawashdeh (1994) and Halpern et al. (1999) do not find empirical support.  
Due to the inconclusive findings we propose the following hypotheses to determine whether 
agency cost of free cash flow are a determinant of PtP-transactions. 
 
H1:  Relative to non-going-private companies, going-private companies 
have substantially greater free cash flows. 
H2: Relative to non-going-private companies, going-private companies 
have substantially lower growth prospects. 
H3:  Relative to non-going-private companies, going-private companies 
have substantially higher payout ratios.  
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B. Information Asymmetry 
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) have acknowledged an “insider- leakage” phenomenon 
preceding the announcement of PtP plans, a theory being initially advanced by Myers and 
Majluf (1984). Management- led PtP-transactions represent, in a sense, an extreme form of 
corporate stock repurchases. Myers and Majluf’s information-asymmetry hypothesis predicts 
that managers issue common stocks when they deem the stock price to be high. Accordingly, 
management would repurchase common shares when the equity-market undervalues the firm 
(Kim and Lyn, 1991). When the informational gaps about asset productivities, future earnings 
potential or positive net present value investment choices between agents and principals 
widen, corporate restructuring will be an attractive alternative for the former party. In such 
circumstances, insiders know the project’s expected return, respectively the intrinsic value of 
the corporation, outside investors do not know enabling the former party to capture the future 
rents.  
Yosha (1993) suggests that information disclosure costs determine the choice of either 
bilateral or multilateral financing. Although, he distinguishes debt financing, the derived 
model can be applied in the context of our paper regarding the choice between public 
(multilateral) and private (bilateral) financing. As opposed to private arrangements, public 
finance relationships require detailed information disclosure in order to convince potential 
investors of a company’s creditworthy and substantial earnings potential - information, which 
will inevitably become available to companies’ competitors. Especially for companies whose 
direct competitors are not publicly listed undesirable reactions on their part may arise. For 
example in 1999 Honsel AG terminated its listing admission due, at least partially, to the 
existence of distorted competition. While Honsel’s main competitors were highly informed 
about its historical and upcoming business development, the information at Honsel’s disposal 
in terms of extensiveness and sensitivity was rather low. A second advantage of private 
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financing, besides avoiding information flows to direct competitors, depicts companies’ 
disgression over the information distribution. Public listing requires comprehensive 
disclosure requirements. Yet often the business development might be inhibited as short-term 
performance becomes more important than the realization of long-term strategic goals. The 
termination of companies’ listing admission on the other hand, allows the supervision of 
information to third parties. Consequently, the company might conduct restructuring actions 
and realize substantial efficiency improvement (Hohn, 2002).  
Overall, it is reasonable to posit the information asymmetry hypothesis as an explanation 
for PtP transactions. Whereas DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984), Maupin, Bidwell and 
Ortegren (1984), Marais, Shipper and Smith (1989) and Damodaran and Liu (1993) 
empirically support the claim that going-private transactions are mainly driven by inside 
information managers possess, whereas Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Jensen (1989), Kaplan 
(1989) and Lee (1992) argue the opposite. In light of the above theory and the indecisive 
findings of prior research, we develop the following prediction:  
 
H4:  Relative to non-going-private companies, going-private companies are 
substantially more undervalued.  
 
Furthermore, Rao, Waters and Payne (1995) find evidence that most companies 
conducting a PtP-transaction are small in size. The idea is based on the premise that there are 
transactions costs of PtP activities related to size, such as the associated cash offer to remove 
possible minority shareholders (freeze-out). According to Kim and Lyn (1991, p 641) “these 
costs are likely to increase with firm size and the number of public stockholders”. However, 
companies’ size is also believed to influence the degree of informational asymmetry, and 
therefore the severity of undervaluation. In particular, larger firms that are more likely to 
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have a diverse ownership base are more prone to information asymmetry than smaller firms 
with fewer, more concentrated owners. Thus, whereas asymmetric information based 
arguments would lead us to predict PtP transactions to be more likely for larger firms as the 
potential benefits are larger, transaction cost based arguments would predict the opposite. 
Buzby (1975), Levine and Aaronovitch (1981) and Palepu (1986), among others, find size to 
be negatively related to the going-private likelihood. Consequently, the following hypothesis 
is developed:  
 
H5:  Relative to non-going-private companies, going-private companies are 
substantially different in size. 
 
C. Illiquidity and Ownership Structure  
Although, it is reasonable to posit the agency cost of free cash flow and information 
asymmetry hypotheses as the most important explanations for going-private transactions, 
Oelschlegel (2001) reveals in her study other motives for a going-private transaction. As a 
consequence, we consider in this study additional quantifiable conditions related to liquidity 
and ownership structure in our analysis. 
One major driving force of a stock’s liquidity is companies’ underlying ownership 
structure. The larger the percentage of companies’ concentrated ownership, the more illiquid 
is the underlying stock. This illiquidity can in turn lead inappropriate company valuation. 
When only a minor fraction of companies’ shares are traded in the stock market, share 
purchases and disposals initiate severe price fluctuations and fail to reflect the fair and 
intrinsic value of a company. Similar to limited partners’ interests, large blocks of shares will 
consequently be traded off-board with the actual share-price serving only as a benchmark 
(Oelschlegel, 2001). Richard and Weinheimer (1999) refer to the prevailing prices as 
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“coincident stock prices”. Furthermore, the company faces diminishing shareholders’ interest 
and analyst coverage. Under such conditions both institutional and retail investors have 
severe difficulties to take the stock price as a valuation standard for the underlying entity 
development and management performance. Yet, without a fair valuation the capital market 
is unable to adequately perform the control and sanction functioning. Consequently, the 
company might consider a PtP-transaction as the costs of being-public outweigh the  
nevertheless unreachable benefits. German PtP transactions are especially suited to 
investigate this issue. In other countries such as the US or UK ownership structures are rather 
dispersed and blockholdings are relatively small and might thus not much influence the going 
private decision. In Germany, dispersed ownership structures are typical only for the largest 
multinationals while most listed companies are characterized by large blockholdings, which 
are relatively stable over time. Based on the voting right structure of 444 firms in March 
2000, Kleimeier and Whidbee (2001) report that on average each German firm has 3.43 
blockholders who jointly control 75.8% of the direct vote. Each blockholder holds voting 
block in 1.27 companies with banks holding an above average number of 3.09 voting blocks 
and for both groups, the average voting block amounts to 21.9% of the direct vote.12 The 
figures reported by Kleimeier and Whidbee (2001) might still underestimate the 
concentration of ownership and voting power as cross-holdings and pyramid structures 
prevail in Germany. In an international comparison, Becht and Roell (1999) correct for this 
when calculating the ultimate voting block. They find, that for most European countries the 
largest shareholder holds about 50% of the voting power. The UK is the most notable 
exception with 9.9%. In more than 50% of all US firms, on the other hand, the largest 
shareholder controls less than 5% of the votes whereas in Germany there are no such firms. 
These differences in ownership concentration across countries, any impact of ownership 
                                                 
12 Note that more recently the above average number of voting blocks for banks have fallen as a tax-law change 
made it attractive for banks to sell their unwanted blockholdings.  
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concentration on going-private transaction will most likely matter in countries with more 
concentrated ownership structures and will be difficult to detect in countries like the US or 
UK. Thus, the German going-private transactions provide a unique opportunity for studying 
this issue. Anecdotal evidence supporting the role of ownership structure concentration is 
available. Exemplary for the successive buyout through companies’ majority shareholder(s) 
was the previous going-private activity of Schaerf AG, Weru AG and Koepp AG 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1999). These transactions where characterized by blockholders’ 
objective to minimize the free-float. According to Hohn (2000), among the German 
companies that conducted a PtP-transaction within the previous years, the free-float 
amounted to less than 5 percent and companies exhibited a concentrated ownership of more 
than 95 percent (such as Magna Media Verlag AG or Friedrich Grohe AG). Hohn’s findings 
are consistent with the reasoning of Maupin et al. (1984, p. 441) “that the greater the 
percentage of shares held by management and the board of directors, the more easily” going-
private transactions can be accomplished.13 Based on the above discussion we develop the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H6: Relative to non-going-private companies, going-private companies 
have substantially more concentrated ownership structures. 
H7:  Relative to non-going-private companies, going-private companies 
have substantially less liquid share trading. 
 
Note that in the first place hypothesis H7 intends to test the shares’ illiquidity. As argued 
above, the higher company’s concentrated ownership structure, the more illiquid is the 
                                                 
13 One could also view this ownership structure related argument in the context of agency cost. Here agency cost 
arise due to a conflict between managers and blockholders on the one side and minority shareholders on the 
other side. These are in general agency cost of equity and not specifically agency cost of free cash flow. As we 
want to investigate the effects of mis -valuation due to illiquidity at this point, we have chosen to differentiate 
this argument and the resulting hypotheses from the agency cost of free cash flow arguments presented earlier. 
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underlying share. Yet, according to the information-asymmetry theory, managers use inside 
information to earn abnormal returns prior to the going-private announcement, which 
inevitably will drive the pre-announcement price run-ups and volume behaviour. Thus, 
although the illiquidity of companies’ shares might not represent an underlying motive for a 
going-private transaction, in case the empirical analysis discloses no support for H7, the 
rejection leads to the conclusion that insiders posses private information and are successful in 
predicting when their firms are undervalued. 
Defenders of going-private frequently suggest another, although qualitative in nature14, 
benefit to the corporation: the anticipated savings of a corporation’s continual expenditures. 
Besides the shareholder communication costs, being necessary to build a long-term 
relationship, the after costs of an IPO consist of the publication requirements. On the one 
hand, the latter expenditure results from the regulations of being a company operating in the 
legal form of a corporation. On the other hand, the stock exchange sets certain release-
requirements depending on the market the company is listed. However, the realization of a 
going-private transaction incorporates expenditures, which might be similar to the unique 
costs of an IPO. Consequently, as Notes (1975, p. 908) examines, “going-private, then, can 
rarely be justified as a money saving device”. 
 
IV. Data and Methodology 
A. Sample Selection15 
In order to collect a sample of German PtP transactions, past PtP-transactions were 
retrieved from the Deutsche Aktieninstitut, Deutsche Börse Group as well as “mandatory” 
                                                 
14 We refer to this benefit as qualitative in nature as any approach to test this prediction would require either a 
telephone-survey or the dispatch of a questionnaire. Furthermore, with regard to the empirical analysis, this 
exclusion does not have any severe effects. The model being developed treats only quantifiable going-private 
characteristics, whereas non-measurable and unobserved factors are expected to be equally and randomly 
distributed across all potential PtP-firms (random element).  
15 A description of all companies included in the going-private as well as the non-going-private sample is 
available upon request. 
  15
and “voluntary” takeover offers published by Germany’s takeover commission. In addition, 
Hohn (2000), Oelschlegel (2001), Kleppe (2002) and de Vries (2002) name various PtP 
transactions. All resulting transactions were compared to Bloomberg’s listings in order to 
verify each going-private transaction and to determine the announced and effective date of 
companies’ listing termination. From Bloomberg, additional PtP transactions were identified 
that were not previously found in the other sources. Finally, a total of 97 companies were 
identified that went private within the time span of 1997 – 2001 as described in Table I. Note 
the growth in PtP transactions over time with 26 and 31 transactions in 2000 and 2001, 
respectively, compared to less than 15 annual transactions in the years before. Also it appears 
that the most common forms of transaction include cold delisting due to mergers and 
voluntary regular delistings. 
 
[insert Table I about here] 
 
This initial sample of 97 going-privates was reduced if one of the following selection 
criteria was not fulfilled: (1) companies had to have their shares quoted with daily share price 
data available for the time span under consideration,  (2) companies’ IPO dates back at least 
three years and (3) all relevant proxy variables needed to test the hypotheses could be 
retrieved from Bloomberg or Hoppenstedt Aktienführer for the full observation period. The 
screening-procedure reduced the original sample of 97 companies to 64 corporations, 
constituting the final going-private sample of this study. 
Based on these 64 PtP transactions, the hypotheses derived in the previous section will be 
tested. The main methodological tool, which will be described in more detail in a later part of 
this section, is a logit regression. Thus, not only companies that have gone private have to be 
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sampled but also companies that did not. Several studies16 have addressed the impact of 
sampling strategies on the finite performance of the maximum likelihood logit estimator. 
Following Kieschnik (1998) the crucial step is to match the choice-based sample (going-
private firms) with either a proportional or balanced random control sampling scheme (non-
going-private companies). As different sampling schemes affect both parameter and variance 
estimates, it can be generally noted that the bias (precision) will decrease (increase) as the 
sample size rises. Yet, according to Kieschnik (1998, p. 189) bias “is clearly present when 
one samples equally (balanced sampling scheme) from two subgroups whose populations are 
substantially different”. To avoid such bias, proportional random control sampling is applied 
in this study with a fraction of 1:1.2 resulting in 76 non-going-private companies to match the  
64 going-private companies17. These 76 observations were selected randomly from the 
population of 1078 companies, which did not realize a going-private activity within the time 
period of 1997 until 2001 and which were obtained from the German Deutsche Börse Group, 
consisting of companies being listed in the C-DAX and NEMAX-ALL SHARE Index.  
 
B. Hypothesis Testing  
In order to test the hypotheses derived in section III within a logit model, empirical 
proxies of the different dependent and independent variables have to be found. In principle, 
the logit model’s dependent variable takes a non-zero value when there is a going-private 
transaction in the next accounting year. Consequently, the model uses financial information 
up to and including the accounting year preceding the event as proxies for the independent 
variables. Thus, accounting data over the period 1994 – 2001, obtained from Bloomberg, are 
                                                 
16 See Cochran (1977), Daganzo (1980), Bull (1993) and Dietrich (2001). 
17 Previous studies have used the following sampling fractions of going-private versus non-going-private 
companies: 1:1.6 (Palepu, 1986), 1:1.5 (Kim and Lyn, 1991), 1:2.5 (Rawashdeh, 1994), 1:1,5 (Rao et al., 1995). 
However these studies use U.S. data. As the U.S. market is substantially larger than the German market, we 
judge the average applied fraction of 1:1.5 of the U.S. studies as too high and reduce the fraction to 1:1.2 to be 
applied to Germans equity market.  
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relevant for the sample ranging from 1997 to 2001. For non-going private firms, these data 
are obtained for the year 2001.   
For hypothesis H1 a proxy for the company’s free cash flow is needed. Gupta and 
Rosenthal (1991) and Opler and Titman (1993) suggested the employment of net operating 
cash flow as a proxy for a firm’s free cash flow. Halpern et al. (1999) notice, however, that 
this measure is misleading as it neglects agency cost. Consequently, we employ a measure 
similar to that used by Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991), which simultaneously adjusts for 
firm size by standardizing the free cash flow estimate by the firm’s book value of total assets. 
These free cash flows to total assets (CFtoTA) are defined as follows.  
 
 
t
tttt
t ASSETSTOTAL
REPURCHASESTOCKDIVIDENDSTAXEBITDA
CFtoTA
---
=  
where 
EBITDA = operating income before depreciation and amortization 
TAX = total income taxes adjusted for the change in deferred taxes 
DIVIDENDS = cash dividends to common and preferred stocks 
STOCKREPURCHASE = net common stock repurchase  
TOTAL ASSETS = book value of total assets 
t = year preceding the going-private transaction 
 
To proxy for the growth prospects of hypothesis H2 we follow Palepu (1976), Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989), Rawashdeh (1994), Rao et al. (1995), Powell (1997) and Halpern et al.  
(1999) who use the (average) growth rate of net sales. In particular, we use the following 
proxies for growth prospects reflecting an average sales growth over one and two fiscal years, 
respectively:  
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where 
SALESGR1 =  annual net sales growth rate during the year preceding the effective date of 
the going-private transaction18 
SALESGR2 =  average annual net sales growth rate during the two years preceding the 
effective date of the going-private transaction19 
It was hypothesized in H3 that going-private firms have high payout ratios, which are 
measured with the following two proxies based on dividend yields. Again, a one- as well as 
two-year time horizon is chosen. Note that by using dividend yield growth rather than the 
dividend yield itself, we implicitly assume that agency problem develop slowly over time 
instead of occurring within one fiscal year. A going private transaction can be seen as a last 
resource to solve this agency problem, and might as such be preceded by dividend increases 
as an alternative and less drastic attempt to solve the agency problem. Solely considering 
dividend yield prior to the year of the going-private transaction (t-1) could therefore be 
misleading.  
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18 Growth of the firm is defined as the annual rate of change in the company’s net sales. For example consider a 
company that conducted a going-private transaction in 2001 with a December 31 fiscal year. Consequently, the 
sales data from fiscal year end 1999 and 2000 is used to compute the annual net sales growth. 
19 Consider the same going-private company as in footnote 16: The sales data from fiscal year end 1998 and 
2000 is used to compute the average annual net sales growth rate during the two years preceding the effective 
date of the going-private transaction. This approach, however, implicitly assumes a constant growth pattern 
(1+g)t.   
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where 
DIVYIELD =  dividend per share divided by the share price 
DIVYIELDG1 =  annual change in dividend yield during the year preceding the effective 
date of the going-private transaction 
DIVYIELDG2 = average annual change in dividend yield during the two years 
preceding the effective date of the going-private transaction 
 
Hypothesis H4 postulates that going-private companies tend to be relatively undervalued 
due to information asymmetry. In line with Palepu (1976), Kim and Lyn (1991), Rao et al.  
(1995) and Powell (1997) representative proxies of this undervaluation hypothesis are 
market-to-book value (MBV) and price-to-earnings (PtoE) ratios.  
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Hypothesis H5 predicts a relationship between company size and the likelihood to go 
private either driven by information asymmetry or transaction cost. To test this hypothesis we 
apply two measures of company size: total assets (TAt) and average market capitalisation 
(AMARKETCAP) which is measured as the arithmetic mean of the last 180 active trading 
days preceding and including the going-private announcement date for going private firms. 
To proxy for concentrated ownership of hypothesis H6, we choose a company’s free-float 
(FREEFLOAT) which measures the fraction of shares held by minority shareholders. The 
lower a company’s free-float, the higher is the concentrated ownership and  thus, the higher 
the likelihood of a potential going-private transaction. Averaged trading volume 
(ATRADVOL) aims to proxy for the illiquidity prediction of hypothesis H7 and is measured 
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as the arithmetic mean of the daily trading volume over the last 180 active trading days 
preceding and including the going-private announcement date20.  
Table II summarizes the going-private likelihood hypotheses developed, the proxy 
variables used within the empirical tests, and the expected sign for each variable.  
 
[insert Table II about here] 
 
 
C. Methodology 
Although this study focuses primarily on the multivariate analysis of the determinants or 
motives of going-private likelihood, we also report univariate descriptive statistics. Whereas 
multivariate analysis controls for the interactions between the explanatory variables, 
univariate descriptive statistics consider each variable separately. The main objective of the 
univariate descriptive statistics is to investigate the hypothesis of a sufficiently large 
difference in the sample means 21 (going-private versus non-going-private) to obtain a 
preliminary indication of the results of the investigation. Consequently, a 2-sample t-test 
assuming unequal variances is performed. On the other hand, the multivariate analysis 
attempts to distinguish among a sample of companies those, which will be subject to a going-
private activity on the basis of a functional relationship between a firm’s characteristics and 
its going-private likelihood in a given period (t+1). Thus, the main objective is to classify the 
company being considered either as a going-private candidate or a remaining public 
candidate. In related areas, Palepu (1986), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Rao et al. (1995), 
                                                 
20 For the going-private sample, this implies to calculate the arithmetic means for market capitalisation and 
trading volume by considering the last 180 active trading days preceding the going-private transaction 
announcement. Yet, for the control sample the period of 180 active trading days refers to the time prior to 
calendar year end 2001. 
21 At this moment the main objective is to test the prevalence of a mean difference in the value of every proxy 
variable for each matched pair of going-private and the corresponding non-going-private companies. With 
respect to the comparison of the summary data it is irrelevant, at least at this stage, whether the corresponding 
mean of the going-private firms is below or above the mean of the control sample. Therefore, the alternative 
hypotheses (HA) are two sided (HA : XGP ?  XNGP).  
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Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Powell (1997) among others employ the concept of the 
multivariate logit probability models. This model22 takes the form:  
 
 [ ]t1t sticscharacteri teGoingPrivafEVENT =+  (1) 
 
where EVENTt+1 is a qualitative dependent variable, taking the value one if the firm goes 
private in the accounting year t+1, and zero if the company remains public. Thus, logit 
analysis relates the likelihood of a going-private event to quantifiable company 
characteristics “while explicitly accounting for a stochastic element in the outcome due to the 
un-measurable and unobservable elements” (Dietrich and Sorensen, 2001, p. 398). 
Furthermore, rather than employing the multi-discriminant analysis to predict going-private 
activities, the concept of logit analysis avoids some of the problems associated with the 
application of the former statistical tool. Eisenbeis (1977) emphasizes in his study on the 
occurring flaws in the application of a discriminant analysis rather than the superior concept 
of logit analysis. As opposed to the former analysis, the latter does not depend on the normal 
distribution assumption. Secondly, the usage of logit analysis enables direct interpretation of 
the various explanatory variable coefficient estimates, whereas multiple discriminant analysis 
coefficients estimates are only unique up to a factor of proportionality.  
 
V. Results 
Table III presents the results of the univariate analysis for the going-private versus non-
going-private sample. In addition to the sample means, the table reports the mean difference 
in the value of each proxy variable for the two samples and the corresponding t-statistics.  
                                                 
22 For a detailed discussion of the logit model including the employment of the logistic cumulative probability 
curve and the maximum likelihood see Eisenbeis (1977), Palepu (1986) or Wooldridge (2000).  
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[insert Table III about here] 
 
 
Regarding the agency cost of free cash flow hypotheses, Panel A of Table III reveals that 
CFtoTA is significantly larger in the going-private sample than in the control sample with an 
average of 0.0510 compared to -0.0032 respectively. Furthermore, both growth proxies 
SALESGR1 and SALESGR2 are significantly smaller for going-private companies with 
growth rates of 0.2100 and 0.0563 compared to 0.6036 and 0.5455 for the control sample, 
respectively. Regarding payout ratios, only the mean difference of the proxy variable 
DIVYIELDG2 is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. As the signs of t-tests 
regarding CFtoTA, SALESGR1, SALESGR2 and DIVYIELDG2 are all as expected, the re is 
strong evidence that going-private firms have larger free cash flows and lower growth 
potential during the year, respectively last two years, preceding the going-private transaction. 
Furthermore the findings indicate that going-private firms have higher average annual 
dividend yield changes during the last two years preceding the PtP-transaction compared to 
non-going-private corporations. In summary, the significant differences across the two 
samples support our assertion that the agency cost of free cash flow are an essential motive 
for a going-private transaction.  
The findings in Panel A of Table III do not support the approach to explain going-private 
transactions by means of the information asymmetry hypothesis. The average difference of 
the PtoE proxy variable across the samples is insignificantly different from zero. With respect 
to the market to book value of equity (MBV), the mean difference of 1.7397 is positive – 
rather than negative as expected – and significant at the 1% level. This provides evidence that 
the firms, which went private on average, tended to be valued higher by the market than non-
going-private firms (3.4155 in contrast to 1.6757). Finally, in contrast to earlier findings, our 
results indicate that going-private firms have an average size of 10,197.36 million euro in 
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total assets compared to the control group with 7,935.56 million euro but this difference is 
not statistically significant as standard deviations are high. Measuring company size via 
market capitalisation does not reveal any significant size difference either with a market 
capitalisation of going-private companies of 1.2 billion euro compared to 1.7 billion for the 
control sample.  
In order to explain the rather unexpected finding with respect to MBV and PtoE, an 
alternative calculation of the proxy is provided in panel B of Table III. Whereas MBV is 
calculated at the year-end prior to the respective observation year for the going-private 
sample, the proxy variable for the control sample was estimated based upon the market 
capitalisation, which prevailed at the end of 2001. However, the national capital market 
development in 2001 in general, and in particular the progress within the last quarter, was 
characterized by extreme price corrections, mainly as a result of investors’ enormous 
insecurities created by the terrorist attacks in New York at the 11th of September. To ascertain 
whether the author’s former findings were disturbed by the far-reaching changes and 
consequences of these attacks, companies’ MBV and PtoE fo r the control sample are 
recalculated by taking the average share-price of 2001. Compared to the initial mean value of 
MBV (1.6757), the recalculated alternative MBV is slightly higher (2.0986), resulting in a 
positive mean difference across the matched pairs of the going-private and the non-going-
private samples of 1.3169, being 0.4228 lower than the original mean value (1.7397). Again 
the null hypothesis of equal means can be rejected – though at the lower significance level of 
5%. Mean PtoE for the control sample drastically increases after averaging 2001 share-prices 
(53.9789 in contrast to the previous mean of 21.3788), leading to a negative mean difference 
across the matched pairs of both samples of -16.2585. Yet the coefficient is still insignificant. 
Thus, we conclude that the event from the 11th of September 2001 and the tremendous price 
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corrections at the German capital market are not responsible for disproving the information 
asymmetry motive of going-private transactions, at least in Germany.  
Regarding the remaining hypotheses of illiquidity and ownership, there is strong evidence 
that PtP-firms have on average greater concentrated capital ownership structures than the 
control sample. The average free-float is 0.1311 for PtP-companies compared to 0.3413. Yet, 
going-private firms show higher average trading volume (195,765.84) than non-going-private 
companies (68,978.17) but the mean difference is insignificant. Overall, whereas the finding 
with respect to FREEFLOAT strongly infers that going-private firms have higher 
concentrated capital ownership structures, the illiquidity hypothesis is not supported when 
considering the insignificance of the coefficients for ATRADVOL. In summary, the 
univariate tests provide support for the agency cost of free cash flow and the control 
motivation of going-private but arguments based on asymmetric information and illiquidity 
cannot be supported.  
Since the preceding (univariate) analysis considered each proxy variable independently, 
the coefficients might loose reliability in determining the variable’s significance in the 
presence of other variables. Therefore, multivariate analysis is employed to estimate the 
common effects on the going-private likelihood. Based upon the earlier discussion there is 
strong evidence that the effects of some variables on a company’s decision to go private 
depend upon the levels of other proxy variables. For example if  a company experiences high 
sales growth, a selfish management could be expected to take the firm private in order to 
maximize the resources under its control. In case of low growth, on the other hand, 
companies are expected to have large free cash flows. 
One major assumption of a multiple regression is the non-existence of perfect 
multicollinearity among the regressors. Before estimating the logit model, we therefore 
conducted a correlation analysis to obtain a preliminary indication for the existence of 
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multicollinearity among the included explanatory variables. As could be expected, the results 
show the highest correlation in absolute terms between the alternative size proxies TA and 
AMARKETCAP (88.08%) and the two growth proxies SALESGR1 and SALESGR2 
(67.34%). Between other proxies correlations are high in absolute terms between CFtoTA 
and SALESGR2 (-20.60%), a result that supports the agency cost of free cash flow 
hypothesis. With respect to the proxy variables that aim to test the existence of information- 
asymmetry, MBV and PtoE, the correlation matrix did not demonstrate any interaction except 
for MBV and FREEFLOAT (-19.52%), PtoE and  SALESGR1 (19.11%),  and PtoE and 
SALESGR2 (18.06%). Yet, based on the insignificance of the mean difference of the proxy 
variable PtoE, one questions, at least at this stage, whether information asymmetry drives 
going-private transactions. The test for any other possible interaction among the model’s  
determinant variables revealed no correlation. The high degree of intercorrelations, especially 
between SALESGR1 and SALESGR2 and TA and AMARKETCAP, will thus be taken into 
consideration when constructing the final logit model.  
To determine which proxies to include in the final logit model, a single factor logit model 
is run first on each determinant factor and revealed the following variables to be significant, 
where the p-values for each coefficient estimate is shown in parentheses: CFtoTA (0.0716), 
SALESGR1 (0.0607), SALESGR2 (0.0158), FREEFLOAT (0.0000) and MBV (0.0769). In 
contrast to the univariate test, DIVYIELDG2 is only statistically discernible at the 12% error 
level under the single factor logit model. In the following, four different logit models are 
presented in Table IV with the objective to determine a model, which has the largest 
explanatory power. Although the McFadden R2 likelihood ratio index is stated, the main 
criterion for the model selection is the AIC criterion and the Schwarz criterion23. In general, 
                                                 
23 Whereas R2 measures the in-sample success of the regression equation in forecasting y and is widely used as a 
quick check of goodness-of-fit, is the AIC- and the Schwarz criterion an effectively estimate of the out-of-
sample forecast error variance. Depending on the specific form of the penalty factor, each criterion embodies its 
own trade-off between the fit (average residual sum of squares divided by the number of regressors) and the 
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one judges a model with a lower value of the criterion to be preferable to alternative models. 
Model I consists of the independent variables that correspond to the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 3. In addition to the exclusion of DIVYIELDG1, we consider the large interaction 
between SALESGR1 and SALESGR2, by omitting SALESGR1 in Model II. Model III aims 
to examine the consequences of excluding all independent variables, except for the ones 
being significant within the univariate analysis. Model IV is similar to Model II with the 
exception of the variable TA, which is not considered in the former model. Note that 51 
going-private firms and 61 non-going-private firms were selected and used in estimation, 
being equal to a ratio of 80% of the whole sample. The remainder of 13 going-private firms 
and 15 non-going-private firms is used to test the models’ predictive power, hereafter referred 
to as the hold-out sample.  
 
[insert Table IV about here] 
 
In Model I, the independent variables SALESGR2, DIVYIELDG2, MBV,  
AMARKETCAP and FREEFLOAT are statistically significant indicating that (1) negative 
average annual sales growth rates during the last two years prior to the PtP-transaction, (2) 
positive dividend yield changes during the previous two years preceding the effective date of 
the going-private transaction, (3) high market to book value of equity, (4) low average market 
capitalisation over the last 180 trading days and (5) high concentrated capital ownership 
structures are likely to increase a company’s probability of becoming a going-private 
candidate. FREEFLOAT is by far the most influential variable on going-private likelihood, 
followed by the next larger significant coefficients of SALESGR2, DIVYIELDG2, MBV and 
AMARKETCAP. Relating these findings to the hypotheses of agency cost of free cash flow, 
                                                                                                                                                        
penalty factor (degrees of freedom). In contrast to R2, both criterions penalize the degrees of freedom more 
harshly. Although AIC and Schwarz should obtain their minimum at the same model, has the Schwarz-criterion 
an extremely strong taste for simple models. For details the author refers to Diebold (2001).  
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information asymmetry, illiquidity and ownership, reveals most support for the agency cost 
of free cash flow motivation of going-private as the two-year growth and payout proxies are 
significant and have the expected sign. The free-cash flow proxy has the expected sign but is 
not significantly different from zero, a finding, which stands in contrast to, the univariate 
analysis conducted earlier. The negative and significant coefficient on the MBV leads to a 
clear rejection of the information asymmetry motivation of going-private. Further measuring 
size by market capitalisation and finding a positive and significant coefficient points into the 
direction of transaction cost rather than information asymmetry as a relevant going-private 
motive. Finally regarding the illiquidity and ownership hypotheses, whereas illiquidity 
measured by trading volume does not seem to be relevant for a firm’s going-private decision, 
ownership structure matters. 
The above conclusions remain unaltered when the variables SALESGR1 and 
DIVYIELDG1 are omitted in Model II. Deleting SALESGR1 allows examining the existence 
of multicollinearity and thus, the high interaction between both growth estimates 
(SALESGR1 and SALESGR2) previously observed. A close inspection of the coefficients’ 
standard error reveals a smaller asymptotic standard error for SALESGR2 (0.6754) in Model 
II compared to the associated error in the initial model (1.4626). Consequently, one is forced 
to conclude that the high standard error of SALESGR2 is a result of multicollinearity. Thus, 
the inclusion of SALESGR1 might bias the coefficients of the remaining variables and 
consequently, the overall performance, prediction accuracy, of the model. Conducting the 
same analysis with respect to the high interaction between TA and AMARKETCAP (Model 
IV) revealed similar findings. Including merely the significant proxy variables of the 
univariate test (Model III) shows as before FREEFLOAT to be a highly important 
determinant of the going-private likelihood. Comparing across the four models shows that 
despite the high correlations indicated above between some proxies, the estimated 
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coefficients do not change in sign or significance (with the exception of DIVYIELDG2) 
across models. Thus, the conclusions drawn above regarding Model I are generally valid for 
all four models. 
The likelihood ratio statistic (LR) is found to be highly significant for all four models. 
Consequently, we infer that the models provide a statistically significant explanation of a 
firm’s going-private likelihood. The McFadden R2 for the four models ranges between 
22.66% and 36.95%, where Model I has the largest explanatory power and Model III the 
smallest. This range is highly acceptable given the cross-sectional variations among the 
independent variables within the four models. Although Model II has a slightly smaller 
McFadden R2 (36.59%) compared to Model I (36.95%), the Akaike-Information criterion and 
Schwarz criterion is applied to select the final model. Unfortunately, the Akaike-Information 
criterion selects Model II to be superior, whereas the minimum of the Schwarz criterion is 
reached at Model IV. Yet, as the explanatory power of Model II (36.59%) is larger than the 
corresponding explanatory level of Model IV (34.04%), we decide to employ Model II for the 
further analysis. 
Interpretation of the coefficient values is complicated based on the fact that estimated 
coefficients from a binary dependent variable model cannot be interpreted as the marginal 
effect on the event, here a firm going private. Yet, as equation 2 shows, the multiplication of 
the estimated coefficients by the value of the density function infers the size of the change in 
probability, and thus, the marginal effect on the conditional probability24.  
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Since the density function is non-negative, the direction of the effect of a change in xj 
depends only on the sign of the coefficient ßj. Thus, positive values of ßj imply increasing xj 
                                                 
24 For further details see Wooldridge (2000).  
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will increase the probability of the response whereas negative values of ßj imply the opposite. 
The last column of Table IV shows the results of the logit analysis with respect to Model II 
where elasticity of means indicates the percentage change in the probability of a firm going 
private as a result of a one percent change in the relevant proxy, keeping the values of the 
remaining regressors constant. Thus, for instance, the coefficient -1.8524 for the explanatory 
variable SALESGR2 indicates, holding all other variables constant, the probability that the 
firm will go private in t+1 declines by 2.2382% for every one-percent increase in 
SALESGR2. Consequently, the higher companies’ average annual net sales growth rates 
during the last two years, the lower the likelihood that they will go private. Likewise, a one 
percent increase in the explanatory variable DIVYIELDG2 will enlarge the chance of a 
forthcoming going-private transaction by 2.1818%. The variable FREEFLOAT has the 
largest impact on the likelihood of a going-private transaction. For every one-percent 
decrease of a company’s free-float, the going-private probability boosts by 6.9557%. 
Although, the explanatory variables AMARKETCAP and MBV are both statistically 
significant at the 10% error level, their impact on the going-private likelihood is only minor.  
Whereas measures such as LR, McFadden R2, AIC and Schwarz reported in Table IV 
already provide an indication about the goodness of fit of the logit model, a more specific and 
detailed view of the predictions provided by Model II can be found in the classification table 
shown in Panel A of Table V. Note that a standard prediction cut-off value of p=0.5 is used 
here. The fraction of going-private firms that are correctly predicted, often referred to as the 
sensitivity, amounts to 82.4%. Specificity, on the other hand, refers to the same measure 
applied to non-going-private firms and equals 78.7%. The number of correct predictions is 
identified as the sum of the main diagonal (90). In summary, the results presented in Panel A 
of Table V clearly show that the predictive power of the logit regression model is very high 
(80.4%). 
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[insert Table V about here] 
 
Since the model parameters are obtained from the estimation sample, the in-sample 
predictive power shown in Panel A of Table V is likely to be biased upwards. Hence, we now 
use the hold-out sample, consisting of 13 going-private firms and 15 non-going-private firms, 
which previously were not considered when deriving the estimation model. Panel B of Table 
V and Figure 1 show the results of this analysis. 
 
[insert Figure I about here] 
 
Based upon the estimated coefficients, the model incorrectly predicts one going-private 
observation, as the predicted probability is only 0.4. With respect to the non-going-private 
classification there is one severe mis-prediction with a predicted probability of p=0.95 that is 
almost the opposite of the true event p=0. However, the overall performance shows a total of 
26 correct predictions, equa l to a success rate of 92.9%. 
Given the model’s explanatory power in- and out-of sample, the arguments for its 
practical application are multifaceted: (1) disclosing (early) warning signals for the existence 
of agency cost of free cash flow problems or information-asymmetry, (2) approving results of 
“being-public” cost-benefit analysis and (3) representing a consulting-tool for corporate-
finance consultancies striving to expand their core-business portfolio. Based upon the 
model’s findings, involved parties might either undertake enhancing steps or 
countermeasures to influence the estimated going-private probability of the company under 
consideration.  
Although the explanatory power of the model is quite high, the insignificance of several 
coefficients and the significant intercept offer strong evidence that the profile of German 
  31
going-private firms cannot entirely be explained in terms of the quantitative proxies applied 
in this paper. Whereas the results suggest support the agency cost of free cash flow and  
ownership hypotheses, it appears that information asymmetry and illiquidity do not explain 
going-private transactions. Several explanations might be responsible for these findings: The 
empirical analysis in this chapter was performed on a sample consisting of 51 going-private 
companies and 61 non-going-private firms settled in various industries. Proceeding in this 
way, industry idiosyncratic conditions on going-private likelihood are likely to be ignored. In 
section II the transaction forms were discussed that inevitably lead to a companies’ direct 
listing termination. Thus, subdividing the going-private sample according to the respective 
transaction form - as depicted by the frequency distribution in Table I - might be beneficial. 
Given the small number of German PtP transactions, however, such an analysis is not feasible 
here. Finally, due to data limitation, one major proxy of the information-asymmetry 
hypothesis is ignored: the company’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR) prior to the going-
public announcement.25 Such a CAR would indicate managements’ information advantage on 
non-public information and their ability to outperform other companies. Consequently, the 
above finding might be biased in the sense that a relevant regressor has been omitted.  
 
VI. Conclusions  
Although several papers have attempted to empirically investigate the motives for going-
private transactions within the Anglo-Saxon region, the authors have failed to expand their 
analysis to Continental European countries in general, and to Germany in particular. This gap 
in the academic literature is especially critical for Germany as recent regulatory changes will 
                                                 
25 Note that our overall sample of going-private and non going-private companies includes “dead” companies. 
Usually Thomson Financial DataStream (Advance 3.5) directly provides companies’ abnormal daily returns. 
However, DataStream does not cover company accounts and equity data on “dead” companies for Germany 
except for the historical trading volume, market capitalisation and dividend yield. This fact was certified by 
further inquiries with the responsible employees of Thomson Financial’s Help-Desk and Company Accounts 
Team.  
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most likely  result in a larger number of going-private transactions and as Germany allows us 
to study the role of illiquidity and ownership concentration. To remedy this shortcoming, this 
study exclusively examined the going-private phenomenon in Germany. Specifically, we 
presented a first attempt to explain the motives for a going-private transaction and to 
empirically examine whether the financial characteristics of German going-private companies 
are distinguishable from firms, which have not gone private. 
Given the results, the analysis offered the overall strongest evidence agency cost of free 
cash flow hypothesis to explain German PtP-transactions. However, our analysis revealed 
contradicting results to clarify going-private transactions in the context of informational 
asymmetry. In sharp contrast to expectation, companies’ going-private likelihood is 
positively affected by an increase in the underlying market to book value of equity. 
Regarding firm size, we find smaller firms to be more likely going-private candidates, a result 
that supports the transaction cost rather than the information asymmetry motivation of going-
private. Finally, regarding the illiquidity and ownership hypotheses, we conclude that a 
company’s ownership proxied by the free-float is relevant whereas illiquidity measured by 
trading volume does not determine the likelihood of a firm to go private.   
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Table I: German Going-Private Transactions 
 
This table presents all German going-private transactions by year and type. A regular delisting 
applies to companies which voluntarily revoke their listing admission or where the revocation 
of the listing admission is cased ex officio. A cold delisting results from a corporate 
restructuring such as a going-private merger or an integration into the parent company. 
Bankruptcy of the company obviously leads to the disappearance of the company’s stock from 
the exchange. 
 
Cold Delistings 
 Total 
Regular 
Delistings M&A Integration Bankruptcy 
      
1997 13 5 5 1 2 
1998 15 5 5 1 4 
1999 12 3 7 2 0 
2000 31 10 12 7 2 
2001 26 8 17 1 0 
      
Total 97 31 46 12 8 
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Table II: Summary of Hypotheses 
 
This table summarizes the hypotheses regarding the motivations for going private. For going-private firms, 
all level proxies are taken the year before the going-private transaction whereas all growth proxies are taken 
over the two years preceeding the going-private transaction. For the control sample of non-going-private 
firms, the data for the year 2001 is used. The average trading volume is calculated based on the last 180 
trading days either before the going-private transaction or before the end of 2001. The sources are 
Bloomberg or Hoppenstedt. A positive expected sign implies that an increase in the corresponding variable 
increases the likelihood of a forthcoming PtP transaction. 
 
Theory Hypothesis Proxies Abbreviation Expected 
Sign 
     
H1 free cash flow to total assets  CFoTA + 
H2 growth rate of net sales SALESGR1, SALESGR2 - 
agency cost of 
free cash flow 
H3 change in dividend yield DIVYIELD1, DIVYIELD2 + 
     
H4 market to book value of equity MBV - 
 price-to-earnings ratio PtoE - 
H5 total assets  TA - 
information 
asymmetry 
 average market capitalisation AMARKETCAP - 
     
H6 free-float FREEFLOAT - illiquidity and 
ownership H7 average trading volume ATRADVOL - 
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Table III: Univariate Analysis 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the sample of 64 German going-private transactions and the control 
sample of 76 German firms that did not go private during the period 1994 to 2002. For all proxies described in table II, 
mean and standard deviation are reported and a univariate test for the difference in means between the two samples is 
conducted. Here, the mean difference is defined as the value for the going-private companies minus the values for the 
non-going-private companies. Thus, a significantly positive (negative) t-statistic implies that the mean of the going-
private sample is larger (smaller) than the mean of the non-going-private sample. * and ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. In Panel B, alternative values for MBV and PtoE are calculated for 
the control sample based on the average share prices during 2001. 
 
Going-Private Companies Non-Going-Private Companies Proxy  
mean standard 
deviation 
mean standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Difference 
t-Statistic 
for 
Difference 
in Mean 
Panel A: Basic specifications 
     
CFtoTA 0.0510 0.0712 -0.0032 0.1650 0.0542  2.5931** 
SALESGR1 0.2100 1.0942 0.6036 0.8541 -0.3936  -2.3393** 
SALESGR2 0.0563 0.3604 0.5455 0.8463 -0.4891  -4.5705* 
DIVYIELD1 0.1071 1.0321 0.2172 2.3565 -0.1101  -0.3676 
DIVYIELD2 0.0003 0.3105 -0.1915 0.6231 0.1919  2.3594** 
MBV 3.4155 2.2266 1.6757 1.9917 1.7397  2.6340* 
PtoE 37.7204 111.4932 21.3788 1,036.1383 16.3416  0.9649 
FREEFLOAT 0.1311 0.1303 0.3413 0.2226 -0.2101  -6.9394* 
TA1 10,197.4 46,590.9 7,935.6 50,990.7 2,261.8  0.2740 
AMARKETCAP1 1,200.8 3,769.6 1,725.8 8,795.7 -524.9  -0.4714 
ATRADVOL1 195,765.7 887,346.8 68,978.2 236,079.2 126,787.6  1.1105 
     
Panel B: Alternative Specifications  
     
MBV  3.4155 2.2266 2.0986 1.3029 1.3169  1.9776** 
PtoE  37.7204 111.4932 53.9789 83.887 -16.2585  -0.4262 
     
1 mean values are given in millions of euros. 
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Table IV: Multivariate Logit Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Going-Private Likelihood 
 
This table presents the results of four multivariate logit regressions which include different sets of 
independent variables. The expected sign in the second column refers to the hypotheses summarized in table 
II. In addition to the estimated coefficients, the z-statistic, computed to test the null hypothesis of a zero 
coefficient, is shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. LR indicates the p-value of the likelihood ratio test statistic, which is computed to test the 
hypothesis that all parameters of the model are simultaneously equal to zero. The McFadden R2 reflects the 
likelihood ratio index of the model. AIC presents the Akaike-Information criterion. Schwarz refers to the 
Schwarz criterion. For model II, the elasticity of means is calculated which indicates the percentage change 
in the probability of a firm going private as a result of a one percent change in the independent variable while 
keeping the values of the other regressors constant. 
 
Independent  
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Elasticity of 
Means for 
Model II 
       
CFtoTA + 3.2554 
(0.9554) 
3.1481 
(0.9486) 
3.7206 
(1.2207) 
2.1864 
(0.7968) 
3.8037 
SALESGR1 - 0.2793 
(0.4981) 
    
SALESGR2 - -2.4335*** 
(-1.6640) 
-1.8524** 
(-2.1414) 
-1.1265*** 
(-1.7229) 
-1.7675** 
(-2.0991) 
-2.2382 
DIVYIELDG1 + -0.0820 
(-0.4733) 
    
DIVYIELDG2 + 1.8563* 
(2.7011) 
1.8058* 
(2.6735) 
0.7315 
(1.4951) 
1.2786** 
(2.2058) 
2.1818 
MBV - 0.1608*** 
(1.9489) 
0.1554*** 
(1.9278) 
0.0961 
(1.3901) 
0.1390*** 
(1.8084) 
0.1878 
PtoE - 0.0091 
(1.3238) 
0.0102 
(1.5231) 
 0.0098 
(1.5070) 
0.0123 
TA - 0.0000 
(1.6007) 
0.0000 
(1.5933) 
  0.0000 
AMARKETCAP - -0.0005*** 
(-1.9149) 
-0.0005*** 
(-1.9117) 
 -0.0003* 
(-2.7708) 
-0.0006 
FREEFLOAT - -5.5758* 
(-3.1615) 
-5.7567* 
(-3.2745) 
-4.5512* 
(-3.3566) 
-6.3404* 
(-3.6153) 
-6.9557 
ATRADVOL - 0.0000 
(1.2083) 
0.0000 
(1.2620) 
 0.0000 
(2.5364) 
0.0000 
constant  0.8972*** 
(1.7888) 
0.9122*** 
(1.8374) 
0.7121*** 
(1.6855) 
0.9117*** 
(1.9197) 
1.1021 
       
LR  57.0414* 56.4851* 34.9819* 52.5437*  
McFadden R2  0.3695 0.3659 0.2266 0.3404  
AIC  1.0833 1.0526 1.1731 1.0699  
Schwarz  1.3746 1.2953 1.3188 1.2883  
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Table V: Classification Results of Logit Model II 
 
This table provides information regarding the goodness of fit of the logit regression model II. Panel A reports 
the results for those firms included in the logit regression whereas Panel B presents results for firms not 
included in the regression sample. P(Dep=1) defines the predicted probability that a firm will go private. 
Correct classifications are obtained when the predicted probability P(Dep=1) is greater than the cut-off 
probability of 0.5 for going-private firms and lower than 0.5 for non-going-private firms. 
 
 Going-Private 
Companies (Dep=1) 
Non-Going-Private 
Companies (Dep=0) 
Total 
Panel A: Within Sample Results 
    
P(Dep=1) = 0.5 9 48 57 
P(Dep=1) > 0.5 42 13 55 
Total 51 61 112 
% correct 82.4% 78.7% 80.4% 
    
Panel B: Hold-Out Sample Results 
    
P(Dep=1) = 0.5 1 14 15 
P(Dep=1) > 0.5 12 1 13 
Total 13 15 28 
% correct 92.3% 93.3% 92.9% 
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Figure I: Predicted Probability of Going-Private for the Hold-Out Sample 
 
Each bar represents a specific company in the hold-out sample. Black bars represent companies that actually 
went private during the sample period whereas companies represented by grey bars did not. The height of the 
bar shows the predicted probability of going-private (GPL forecast) based on logit model II. Incorrectly 
predicted firms are indicated with a * 
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